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DNA AND HOMICIDE CLEARANCE: WHAT’S REALLY GOING ON?
David Schroeder
Western Connecticut State University
Abstract
Homicide clearance rates in the United States have been dropping steadily since the
late 1960s. The literature on homicide clearance has yet to explore exactly what
effect DNA evidence is having on the homicide investigation. As such, the increased
use of DNA as an investigative tool to raise homicide clearance is hardly axiomatic.
The current study examined homicides committed in Manhattan, New York, within the
years 1996 to 2003 for the use of DNA evidence in making an arrest. An analysis was
also conducted with an eye toward how useful DNA evidence could be—indicating
that, via its current usage, the creation of large DNA databases of known criminal
offenders will, at best, only marginally increase the homicide clearance rate. Further,
the implications of the use of DNA may point to a larger phenomenon which may have
contributed to the drop in clearance experienced nationwide.

DNA and Homicide Clearance: What’s really going on?

H

omicide clearance rates have dropped considerably in the United States since
the late 1960s (Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), 2002c; Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), 2006; Regini, 1997; Wellford & Cronin, 1999). As the
homicide clearance rate has been called “the litmus test” for the efficacy of homicide
investigations (Simon, 1991) it would seem logical to deduce that police across the
country are not doing as good a job solving murders as they did in the past. Despite
its potential, little is actually known about how DNA evidence is used by investigators
at the pre-arrest stage of a homicide case. Indeed, we do not even know how often
DNA-testable samples are gathered or examined, and therefore become available to
investigators. As such, it is unclear what, if any, impact this scientific evidence is
having on homicide investigations, much less how this potential might be enhanced.
There exists a dearth of research specifically on homicide clearance—and what
does exist seems to focus on circumstances surrounding the murder or homicide
event (Addington, 2006; Litwin, 2004; Regoeczi, Kennedy, & Silverman, 2000; Reidel
& Rinehart, 1996; Wolfgang, 1958). Only one study has specifically examined
investigative procedure in relation to clearance (Wellford & Cronin, 1999).
Conventional wisdom proffers the idea that forensic evidence helps in solving
homicide cases (Fisher, 2000; Gaines & Kappeler, 2005; Geberth, 1983, 1996;
Gilbert, 1993; Inman & Rudin, 2001; Lyman, 1999). However, this conventional
wisdom assumes that the forms of evidence that were used before DNA became
available were not as good at producing clearances as DNA is today. The notion that
DNA could be having anything other than a positive effect on clearance rates runs
counter-intuitive to conventional investigative thinking. However, the relationship
between DNA and clearance has not been examined previously; therefore, the
possibility exists that conventional wisdom may be in error.
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The Rise of DNA
The first homicide cases to use DNA evidence in the course of the investigation or trial
were in the mid-1980s (Morton, 2001). By 1996, evidence from 15,000 cases was
referred to publicly operated DNA labs; in 1997 the number jumped to 21,000 (BJS,
2000). By the year 2000 that number was up to 25,000 (BJS, 2002a). Two-thirds of
prosecutors’ offices used DNA evidence during plea negotiations or felony trials in
2001, up from about one-half in 1996 (BJS, 2002b). In 1998, 98% of public labs were
analyzing DNA for law enforcement agencies (BJS, 1998). The rise of DNA evidence
in the prosecution of crime, homicide or otherwise, is beyond dispute. However, what
is conspicuously absent from the data above is any indication of how DNA is being
utilized at the pre-arrest stage of a homicide investigation—it is unclear if DNA is
being used before or after an arrest has been made. As such, it is difficult to
determine whether DNA is helping to clear cases or just helping to convict (or force a
plea once an arrest has been made).
DNA and the Corrective Effect
Confessions, eye-witness identifications, and witness statements are all forms of
evidence which are subjective in nature and can be in error, or they can change (or be
changed) over time (Cutler & Penrod, 1995; Fabian, Stadler, & Wetzels, 1995).
Certain forms of forensic evidence cannot be changed over time—at least not at the
investigative level. Arguments in courtrooms on the veracity of the forensic analysis
of any given piece of physical evidence are frequent; experts with differing forensic
interpretations of physical evidence are frequently found on opposite sides of a case
during trials. However, at the investigative level, once a determination has been
made by a forensic expert (i.e. fingerprint examiner, coroner, ballistics examiner),
investigators generally are not at liberty to question the veracity of that forensic
determination (Fisher, 2000; Gaines & Kappeler, 2005; Geberth, 1983, 1996).
Therefore, an analysis of how this shift from subjective forms of evidence 40 years
ago to the use of an objective form of evidence, like DNA, has impacted homicide
clearance seems like the logical next step.
Research into another violent crime has already found that objective DNA
evidence does prove to exclude from suspicion the tested suspect in a significant
number of cases. When studying sexual assault, the National Institute of Justice
(1996) noted that in one-quarter of sexual assault cases referred to the FBI, the
primary suspect had been excluded by forensic DNA testing. Further, the report
concluded that:
The fact that these percentages have remained constant for 7 years,
and that the National Institute of Justice’s informal survey of private
laboratories reveals a strikingly similar 26 percent rate, strongly
suggests that postarrest and postconviction DNA exonerations are tied
to some strong, underlying systematic problems that generate
erroneous accusations and convictions (NIJ, 1996, p. xxvii).
As such, it seems likely that a “corrective effect”—the excluding of suspects from
suspicion by the use of objective physical evidence—has already been documented
within cases of sexual assault and there is reason to believe that the same or similar
systematic problems may be found in homicide investigations as well (in fact, given
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the absence of a victim statement in a homicide case, this effect could be much
greater).
Prior Research on Circumstances of the Homicide Event
Marvin Wolfgang (1958), in his seminal work conducted within the city of Philadelphia,
examined homicides committed between January 1, 1948 and December 31, 1952.
This was the first time in the literature that an assertion had been made that certain
elements found at, in, around, or in relation to a homicide could predict whether the
case would remain “unsolved.” Wolfgang (1958) found that unsolved homicides have
higher proportions of:
1)
white male and white female victims;
2)
victims 65 years of age or over;
3)
robbery motives;
4)
victims who were strangers to their assailants;
5)
beatings;
6)
week-end slayings;
7)
deaths occurring outside the home, and in the street (pg. 294).
When examining the above list of variables with a subjective/objective lens it
seems evident that only number 3 (robbery motives) and number 4 (victims who were
strangers to their assailants) are not objectively determinable before a suspect has
been found. All of the other variables seem to be objectively observable from the
moment (or very shortly thereafter) the homicide is discovered, and all are things that
homicide investigators would have almost no ability to affect.
As the dataset utilized by Wolfgang predated any nationwide use of forensic
evidence (or the current scientific standards found therein), it seems reasonable to
deduce that subjective forms of evidence (i.e. eyewitness statements, eyewitness
identifications, and confessions) would have been the norm in “solving” homicide
cases found in Philadelphia, and indeed the entire country at that time.
Wolfgang (1958) also addressed many of the same concepts found in later
research on homicide clearance:
A high portion of unsolved homicides may indicate ineptitude of the
police. On the other hand, a police force may be well organized, free of
corruption, unusually efficient, and well trained; yet because of its being
understaffed, fail to have sufficient time to investigate adequately all
cases.
To these factors that affect the proportion of unsolved
homicides should be added: size and density of a community;
prevailing mores regarding respect for law and authority; the extent to
which the culture pattern ennobles the dignity and worth of individual
human life; the degree to which members of the community have
internalized prevailing culture values; the amount of internal and
external pressure to confess (italics in original, pg. 285).
From this it can be argued that the issues and problems experienced by homicide
investigators in working with the public then were as varied and problematic as they
are today—and yet the homicide clearance rate remained above 90%.
Reidel and Rinehart (1996) examined 3,066 Chicago murders, committed
between 1987 and 1991. They found that:
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The single most important variable to predict whether a murder will be
cleared was whether it involved a concomitant felony. Where the
murder occurred in the context of a suspected felony, robbery, or rape,
it was substantially less likely to be cleared than murders involving
arguments or brawls (pg. 97).
In other words, the weapon used, the age, race, and gender of the victim all
had little or no predictive value. Further, Reidel and Rinehart (1996) point out:
The most important variables affecting clearances are community
involvement with the police investigation and eyewitness
testimony…With respect to clearances, murder is unlike other forms of
violence because the victim generally cannot provide information. This
means that information relevant to clearances must come from one or
more of three sources: (1) the homicide setting; (2) the behavior of third
parties; (3) investigative activities (pg. 85).
Homicide setting and the behavior of third parties are things that homicide
investigators have little ability to affect—they are by-and-large out of the investigator’s
control. Investigative activities or investigative tack, on the other hand, is something
the homicide investigator has total control over (Fisher, 2000; Geberth, 1996).
Regoeczi, Kennedy, and Silverman (2000), noting that the drop in homicide
clearance in the U.S over the last 40 years is similar to the drop in homicide clearance
1
experienced in Canada over the same time period, analyzed homicide clearance
rates in both countries. By examining victim and offense characteristics they found a
correlation between some of those characteristics and homicide clearance in both
countries as a whole—namely that homicides are likelier to be solved if the victim is a
child (under 10) or the murder was not connected to another felony—a similar finding
to Reidel and Rinehart (1996). They also found that some of these correlations
disappeared when the analysis was brought to the state level (comparisons between
New York and Ontario).
Further, Regoeczi et al. (2000) undertook a comparison between the U.S. and
Canada because they felt that the drop in clearance experienced by both nations may
have a similar cause. This is germane to the present analysis in that, if the use of
forensic evidence (i.e. DNA) is related to clearance in the U.S., then one would expect
this relationship to also exist in other countries where homicides are investigated in a
similar fashion and the use of forensic evidence has been comparable (like Canada).
The five hypotheses tested by Regoeczi et al. (2000) all contain variables which
cannot be affected by those investigating the homicide (gender, race, and age of
victims, use of a firearm, and occurring during the commission of another offense). As
such, this study avoided any discussion of how the homicides were investigated and
whether or not aspects of the investigation were a factor related to clearance.
Puckett and Lundman (2003) analyzed factors affecting homicide clearance via
data collected from homicides in Columbus, Ohio from 1984 through 1992. The
analysis they conducted supported four conclusions regarding homicide clearance:
homicides in African American neighborhoods have lower clearance rates; extralegal

1

Regoeczi et al., (2000), citing data from Cardarelli & Cavanagh (1992) and Silverman & Kennedy (1997)
point out that cleared homicides in the U.S. dropped from 93% to 66%, and Canada’s clearance rate
dropped from 95% to 80% from the years 1961 to 1991 (pg. 135).
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factors such as the victim’s race do not affect clearances; detective workload does not
affect clearances; and detectives work hard to clear all homicide cases.
What is of direct relevance to the current study is an observation made by Puckett
and Lundman in evaluating the research presented above (and below). They state
that this previous research taken in concert “suggests that homicide clearances rise or
fall on the amount of physical evidence created while committing the murder” (Puckett
& Lundman, 2003, pg. 175). Puckett and Lundman (2003), relying on the Locard
2
Exchange Principle, claim that the use of weapons that promote close physical
contact leave behind more traces of physical evidence for the police to find, and
therefore produce higher clearance rates. The authors avoid a discussion of the most
likely criticism of this theory—that increased physical contact also increases time and
therefore the likelihood of witness involvement.
Litwin (2004) analyzed data from the Chicago Homicide Dataset for the years
1965 through 1995 by examining factors affecting homicide clearance which are
primarily “nondiscretionary”—factors those investigating the homicide could not affect.
Borrowing from Black’s (1976) theory on valued and non-valued members of society,
Litwin examined these homicide cases to determine if cases involving “non-valued”
members of society had a lower clearance rate. Although his examination does not
support Black’s theory, Litwin did find that certain factors which the police had no
control over—no ability to interpret on their own—were predictive of a case remaining
un-cleared.
What is of importance in deference to the current study is Litwin’s definition of
“non-discretionary” and “discretionary” in relation to homicide investigations. Litwin
(2004) lists certain variables as having a non-discretionary status: concomitant felony,
victim age (both under 10 and over 65), body location, area-wide adult educational
attainment and educational expenditure, racial make-up of educational attainment,
income, employment, and residence. He then concludes, “The homicide clearance
literature appears to indicate that only nondiscretionary factors affect homicide
clearances” (Litwin, 2004, pg. 334). The discretionary variables that he sought to test
were 1) the gender of the victim, 2) the race of the victim, and 3) the prior arrest
record of the victim (Litwin, 2004). Clearly those investigating homicides can make
decisions regarding myriad variables other than the age, race, and prior record of the
victim during the course of an investigation (i.e. truthfulness of a witness statement or
3
confessions seem far more salient). In other words, even though Litwin’s analysis
was originally reliant on the idea that “only factors beyond police control should shape
homicide clearances” (pg. 331), his research seems to support the idea that the more
subjective the evidence used in a homicide case, the greater the chance the case will
be cleared (whether Litwin classifies it as “discretionary” or not).
Addington (2006) examined homicide clearance data provided by the National
Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS). In this research note, Addington tests the
utility of NIBRS data against the previous standards in homicide clearance data, the
Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and the Supplemental Homicide Report (SHR) of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As Addington’s focus is on testing a new

2

3

In short, it is not possible to come in contact with an environment without changing it in some small way,
either by adding to it or by taking something away from it. This concept of transfer is the so-called
Locard Exchange principle and is the basis for a study of trace evidence (Fisher, 2000, pg. 161).
This is of little import to Litwin as his study is designed to test Black’s theory of “valued” vs. “non-valued”
bias on behalf of law enforcement.
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4

dataset, her focus remains set on comparisons between NIBRS and the UCR/SHR.
This is relevant to the current research in that clearance via the UCR can be
determined only as a rate—the UCR does not allow for extending the analysis of any
one cleared case to specific elements within that case. The SHR does allow for
specific analysis of factors related to any given homicide case, however it does not
record the clearance status of that case. In other words, to effectively use UCR and
SHR data to discover elements related to homicide clearance, one must rely on proxymeasures to determine whether the case has been cleared—most notably the
existence of any suspect or assailant information. This, of course, is problematic as
there are several ways in which a case may warrant the recording of suspect or
assailant information but the case could still remain uncleared. However, by
analyzing NIBRS data, Addington’s (2006) findings are consistent with other
clearance research:
Analysis of NIBRS data suggest that factors related to evidence play an
important role in predicting clearance, considering that knives and
contact weapons as well as home location are associated with
clearance. These findings are consistent with prior studies by Puckett
and Lundman (2003) and Wellford and Cronin (1999), both of which
used actual clearance measures collected from police records (pg.
148).
Thus Addington (2006), while showing a great value to the use of the very limited
NIBRS data, supports the notion that clearance research is most educational when
conducted on data collected from original police records.
Prior Research on Investigative Procedure
Wellford and Cronin (1999) examined 798 homicides that occurred in four large U.S.
cities during 1994 and 1995. The study was conducted in four parts, only the last two
are relevant here: a logistic regression analysis, and statistical regression models
created from correlations between variables and the solving of a case. The
instrument used was the Homicide Attribute Coding Instrument (HAC) which consisted
of over 220 variables covering over a dozen general topics relevant to the solving of a
homicide case. They found that approximately 55 of the variables they tested were
positively correlated to a cleared homicide and more than a dozen of those 55 were
procedural in nature. Several of these procedural variables have to do with first
responder activity. They found that:
The probability of clearance increases significantly when the first officer
on the scene quickly notifies the homicide unit, the medical examiners,
and the crime lab and attempts to locate witnesses, secure the area,
and identify potential witnesses in the neighborhood (Wellford &
Cronin, 2000, pg. 6).
The data they collected also indicate that the number of detectives assigned to the
case, the time in which they arrive at the homicide scene, and the use of computer

4

Addington notes that the NIBRS data she examined represent homicides reported by law enforcement
agencies which cover only 17% of the U.S. population.
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databases of various types were also strongly correlated with clearance (Wellford &
Cronin, 1999).
Puckett and Lundman (2003) draw two conclusions which are directly relevant to
police investigative procedures in their analysis of homicide data from Columbus,
Ohio. First, detective experience and workload do not affect homicide clearance.
Second, the
…visibility and seriousness of homicide and the singular importance of
homicide clearances combine to cause homicide detectives to work
aggressively to clear all homicides irrespective of the places where they
occur and the characteristics of homicide victims (Puckett & Lundman,
2003, pg. 189).
Puckett and Lundman (2003) felt this was an area to examine as they noted other
police duties provide many avenues for evaluation (e.g. writing tickets, misdemeanor,
or other felony arrests), but homicide investigators are left with only one course of
evaluation—the homicide clearance rate. As such, Puckett and Lundman (2003)
wanted to test how such a motivator to complete an investigation would be affected by
other “extralegal” factors (such as victim race or place of residence).
This is of particular importance to the present analysis in that it supports the idea
that the conscious legitimate effort on behalf of law enforcement could be the fuel
behind the effect of unseen changes in investigative decision making. In other words
homicide investigators are probably doing exactly what we want them to do—
vehemently following a trail of physical evidence. This trail of objective physical
evidence may simply be better at keeping “incorrect” arrests from happening than it is
at providing new avenues of investigation—suspects are no longer subject to arrest
outside of an objective standard of evidence presented by the use of physical
evidence.
Homicide Clearance, DNA, and the Corrective Effect
The conventional wisdom mentioned above would require changes to how murders
are being conducted or in the relationships or conditions which exist between victim
and offender to explain the drop in homicide clearance experience in the last 40 years
5
(which undoubtedly has happened to some degree).
However, when looking for influences that have been both ubiquitous throughout
the entire country and increasing incrementally since the 1960s, it would also seem
prudent to examine the rise of certain objective forms of forensic evidence; DNA being
the most prominently discussed today. As such, the research questions this study
seeks to examine, in relation to homicide investigations, are:
1)
How often is DNA evidence available in homicide cases and how many
investigations actually have an analysis of some DNA evidence available
at the pre-arrest stage?
2)
How is the use of DNA related to homicide clearance?
3)
Could a “corrective effect”—the effect of the increased use of DNA—be
related to the drop in homicide clearance?

5

For a detailed discussion of these changes please see Zahn and Jaimeson (1997).
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Method
To research the connection between the use of DNA and a successfully cleared
homicide, an analysis was conducted on homicide case files within the Borough of
Manhattan, New York City, between the years 1996 and 2003. Case files were
selected after an extensive examination revealed how many cases had a forensic
analysis of viable DNA evidence available before making an arrest. Then an analysis
of exactly what the DNA analysis accomplished within each investigation was
conducted with respect to 4 categories: “victim only DNA,” “direct link between a
tested suspect and evidence from the crime scene,” “database could provide further
lead,” and “insufficient DNA for analysis.”
The Borough of Manhattan is uniquely suited to this study as Manhattan is one of
the most densely populated areas in America. Therefore, it would be logical to expect
issues in crime exacerbated by population density to be very apparent. Further, the
transient nature of those residing in parts of Manhattan would suggest a greater
number of stranger-to-stranger crimes: crimes for which previous research has
indicated DNA evidence would figure more prominently. Also, one would expect the
6
experience of Manhattan homicide detectives to be among the most erudite in the
profession, owing to the number of homicides which occur in New York City as well as
the NYPD’s resources and reputation in law enforcement. As such, an analysis of
homicide cases from this Borough can arguably be applied to almost any large
metropolitan area in America.
Data Collection
The cohort of homicide case files within the Borough of Manhattan from the years
1996—2003 was sought. Out of the total 1,037 case files, 10 were determined to be
incorrectly recorded (they in fact were not homicides) and 80 files were cleared as
“exceptional” or “justifiable”—both designations irrelevant to the present analysis. Out
of the remaining 947 case files, 354 (or 37.4%) were unavailable leaving a total of 593
files examined. However, the clearance status of each unavailable file was still
determinable via information provided by the Homicide Analysis Unit of the NYPD.
Cases were unavailable for myriad reasons: the case file was with the prosecutor’s
office as the case was in or near trial, the file was in transit between various
departments, or the file was needed in conjunction with other on-going investigations.
Each located file was then examined for information regarding the collection and
examination of DNA evidence. This was determined by examining any “found
property invoice” (sometimes called a “voucher”), which is necessary in commencing
any action by the two agencies responsible for all serological analysis requested by
the NYPD (The Forensic Investigation Division of the NYPD and the Office of the
Chief Medical Examiner). Nothing about this study required the identification of
anyone involved, and to that end, no victim, suspect, witness, officer, or detective
information was recorded in any way.
By examining this request for serological analysis, in conjunction with the date of
arrest (found on follow-up reports) and the presence of any report regarding DNA
analysis, it was possible to determine whether or not the detectives investigating the
6

Point of fact: At this time NYPD does not employ “homicide detectives” per se. The current
organizational structure simply assigns detectives to precincts. If a homicide occurs in that precinct it is
assigned to one of the presently assigned detectives.
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murder had 1) found or considered DNA evidence relevant to the investigation, 2)
requested any DNA analysis, 3) had that analysis available to assist them (i.e.
implicate a known suspect) or 4) used that analysis to exclude someone (i.e. failed to
implicate a tested suspect) from their investigation, whether an arrest was made or
not. It should be noted, in deference to the use of DNA (3 and 4 above) that the
implication or failure thereof provided by a DNA analysis does not necessarily
constitute inclusion, or exclusion, of a suspect in any given investigation. However,
clearly a failure to implicate a suspect via DNA analysis would not serve to assist in
the arrest of that suspect. Therefore, a failure to implicate would at least provide no
helpful information and at most clear a suspect of all suspicion. In other words, a
corrective effect would have at least fostered the failure to gather further helpful
information, and at most freed someone who was incorrectly suspected.
Therefore, each case was assigned one of four DNA Case Model Designations
(DNA-CMD): DNA-CMD-1, DNA is not a factor in the investigation; DNA-CMD-2, DNA
analysis was requested, but not used; DNA-CMD-3, a DNA analysis was available in
the investigation prior to an arrest; or DNA-CMD-4, a DNA analysis failed to implicate
at least one tested subject. The homicide case’s clearance status serves as the
dependent variable—the case is either open or cleared by arrest. The DNA Case
Models themselves will serve as independent variables in examining how clearance is
related to each case model. Solved and unsolved cases (the clearance rate) for each
category is then calculated and used in exploring the efficacy of DNA evidence in
clearing homicide cases.
Hypotheses
The size and clearance rates of DNA CMD-3 and 4 will be used to examine
hypothesis 1: DNA evidence has played a substantial role in clearing homicide cases
in Manhattan from 1996 to 2003.
The clearance rates for each of the four DNA-CMDs will be used to examine
hypothesis 2: Cases with DNA analyses (DNA-CMD-3 and -4) will have higher
clearance rates than cases without DNA analyses (DNA-CMD-1 and -2).
The number of cases in which evidence was collected and not examined (DNACMD-2) and the clearance rate of this group will be examined in testing hypothesis 3:
The building of large DNA databases will significantly assist in raising the homicide
clearance rate.
An examination of what the DNA in each case actually accomplished will be
conducted in testing hypothesis 4: Has a “corrective effect” caused by the use of DNA
evidence been related to the drop in homicide clearance?
Results
Clearance Rates by Year
From Figure 1 it can be seen that the overall clearance rate for the unavailable cases
(59.6%) is very similar to the overall clearance rate for the available cases (61.6%).
This finding prima face suggests that there is nothing significantly different between
the unavailable and the available cases regarding clearance.
Figure 2 displays the clearance rates for the available and the unavailable files, as
well as Manhattan overall, and the U.S. overall, per year. The clearance trend
experienced by Manhattan over the time period examined is more sporadic than the
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nation as a whole. Manhattan’s clearance rate reaches a high of 73% in 1998 and a
low of 48% in 2003. The nation as a whole has a much smaller fluctuation—from a
high of 69% in 1998 and a low of 62% in 2003. The fluctuations in the clearance rates
of the available and unavailable files are greater than the fluctuations in clearance for
Manhattan or the nation as a whole. Unavailable files have a high of 73.9% in 2001
and a low of 42.6% in 1996, a span of more than 30%. The available files have a
near identical span with a high of 74.1% in 1998 and a low of 44.4% in 2003. From
this it seems clear that Manhattan’s overall clearance rate seems to more closely
resemble the clearance rates of the available files than it does the U.S. overall. This
is to be expected as the overall clearance rate for Manhattan is an average of the
clearance rates of the available and unavailable files. However, these differences
could also speak to possible problems with the generalizability of this study’s findings
to other cities in the U.S.—although the clearance rate of the files analyzed here (the
available files) is representative of Manhattan as a whole, Manhattan may not be
representative in clearance of the nation or any specific city within it.

Figure 1.
Overall homicide clearance rates for the Borough of Manhattan, New York City, by file
availability, 1996 through 2003

Although the overall clearance rates for the available and unavailable files are not
dissimilar (Figure 1), the differences in year to year clearance rates do fluctuate
somewhat—the largest gap between the two groups being in 2002. In that year the
available files had a clearance rate of 74% and the unavailable files had a clearance
rate of 50%; a 24% difference. The smallest gap in clearance occurs in the year
1999—in that year the available case files had a clearance rate of 66.7% and the
unavailable cases had a clearance rate of 64.6%. In four years (1996, 1998, 1999,
and 2002) the clearance rate for the available files was greater and in four years
(1997, 2000, 2001, and 2003) the clearance rate for the unavailable files was greater.
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The average difference in clearance rates between available and unavailable files
overall was 11.5%.

Figure 2.
Clearance rates per year
80
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U.S. Overall*
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Source – Bureau of Justice Statistics Homicide Trends in the United States,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/clearedtab.htm

The Available Files
Figure 3 indicates that in 1996, evidence likely to produce a DNA analysis was not
collected (and therefore presumably not perceived to be a factor in the investigation)
in over 65% of the homicide cases. This percentage drops consistently each year and
by 2003 has dropped to around 35%. As expected, this decrease in DNA CMD-1 is
matched by an increase in DNA CMD-2: by 2003 more than half the cases involved
the collecting of evidence likely to yield a DNA analysis.
This indicates that there has been, within this police department, an increased
interest in the use of DNA evidence in solving homicide cases. However, as DNACMD-3 and -4 indicate, this interest is not met with a corresponding increase in use.
Quite surprisingly, DNA analyses available pre-arrest were found in only 40 cases
(DNA CM-3 and 4 combined). As such, of the original 593 cases, only 6.7% were
affected by a DNA analysis pre-arrest.
The next logical question—how often is DNA being used in relation to how often
evidence likely to yield a DNA analysis is taken from crime scenes?—is assessed by
determining the number of cases which could realistically need the help of a DNA
analysis in relation to the number of cases which have used a DNA analysis (N = 40).
From Figure 3 it is apparent that 270 cases (DNA-CMD-2, -3, and -4 combined) out of
a total 593 (or 45.5%) have the potential for the creation and use of a DNA analysis as
part of the investigation. Out of the 270 cases that have the potential to use a DNA
analysis, only 40 did. This means that analyses of DNA evidence taken from
homicide crime scenes are only being conducted in 14.8% of the cases in which a
DNA analysis could possibly be conducted. It would therefore seem that homicide
investigators are seeking the objective/scientific certainty provided by a DNA analysis
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in a very modest number of cases in which such an analysis is possible before making
an arrest.

Figure 3.
Percentage of DNA Case Models per year

70
60
50
40
30

Percent

20
10
0
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

DNA-CMD-1, DNA is determined not to be a factor
DNA-CMD-2, Evidence likely to yield DNA analysis is collected, but not used
DNA-CMD-3, DNA Analysis Conducted Pre Arrest
DNA-CMD-4, DNA Analysis failed to link tested subject(s)

However, to properly analyze this 14.8% in context we must first ascertain: For
how many cases is the certainty provided by DNA really necessary in affecting an
arrest? Simon (1991) proposes that there are two types of homicide investigations:
“whodunits,” in which a suspect is not readily available at the scene and “dunkers” in
which “the detective steps over the body to meet the unrepentant…[killer], who has
not bothered to change his bloodied clothes …” (pg. 39-40). Simon’s colorful example
notwithstanding, it would be disingenuous to expect DNA to play a role in cases which
Simon (1991) would describe as dunkers. Therefore it would seem logical to examine
the use of DNA in only those cases that could be described as whodunits.
Although accepted definitions of “whodunits” or “dunkers” have not been vetted by
the existing literature, it would seem cogent to use as a proxy-measure the time
lapsed between the reporting of the crime and clearing of the case as a rough
indication. As such, the original data provided by the NYPD Homicide Analysis Unit
was examined regarding the date of offense and the date of any recorded clearance
for the cohort of homicide cases (Figure 1—947 cases total). If these two dates were
found to be within 2 days of each other the case was classified as a “dunker.” Any
case not cleared within 2 days was classified as a “whodunit.” Of the original 947
7
cases 226, or 23.8%, are dunkers. By removing the dunkers from the above analysis
we come up with a slightly different percentage of cases which have a DNA analysis

7

It should be noted that 5 of the 947 cases did not have clear dates stated for the commission of the
offence or the date of clearance.
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available pre-arrest—the numerator remains the same, 40, but the denominator
changes from 593 to 430.
Forty DNA cases out of a total of 430 available whodunits (716 whodunits total,
286 of which were unavailable files) works out to 9.3%. In other words, once we
remove all the influence caused by cases that are immediately cleared (the dunkers),
the percentage of cases which have a DNA analysis available to them pre-arrest only
changes from 6.7% to 9.3%.
Moreover, when the total number of whodunit cases from DNA-CMD-2 (N = 136)
is combined with the original 40 DNA cases, a total of 176 cases that could feasibly be
affected by a DNA analysis are noted. Therefore, when the dunkers are removed
from the analysis, the above stated 14.8% of DNA-CMDs -2, -3, and -4 increases to
22.7%. In other words, in only about one quarter of the cases in which DNA could
feasibly be used, it is actually being used (feasibility being determined by both the
collection of evidence likely to yield a DNA sample at the crime scene and the lack of
an immediate solution [whodunit]). It would seem that even when testing the utility of
DNA evidence within the context of Simon’s (1991) dichotomy (dunkers and
whodunits), DNA analysis is not conducted very often, even when evidence likely to
yield a DNA analysis is available. Therefore, in deference to hypothesis 1, DNA alone
could not have had a substantial effect on homicide clearance within the Borough of
Manhattan. Possible reasons for the infrequent use of DNA analyses in homicide
cases are discussed below.

Figure 4.
Overall homicide clearance rates for the Borough of Manhattan, New York City, by
DNA-Case Model Designation - 1996 through 2003

Note: DNA CM-1: DNA not relevant to the investigation;
DNA CM-2: DNA was requested, but not used;
DNA CM-3: DNA analysis available pre-arrest;
DNA CM-4: DNA analysis failed to implicate a tested subject
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Clearance rates of the DNA-CMDs
The overall clearance rates of each DNA-CMD can be seen in Figure 4; a year by
year breakdown is visible in Figure 5. Overall, the highest clearance rates are found
in DNA-CMD-2; the lowest clearance rate found within DNA-CMD-2 is in 2003 and is
above 60%. DNA-CMD-1 possesses a lower overall clearance rate but does exceed
DNA-CMD-2 in the year 1999. The DNA cases (DNA-CMD-3, and -4) have, per year,
wildly fluctuating clearance rates; DNA cases have an overall clearance rate of 27.5%.
At first glance, Figure 5 seems to indicate that DNA has been somewhat useful in
certain years; most visibly in 1996, 1999, and 2002. However, in 1996 there were
only 8 DNA cases (7 from DNA-CMD-3, and 1 from DNA-CMD-4), in 1999 there were
9 cases (1 from DNA-CMD-3, and 8 from DNA-CMD-4), and in 2002 there were only 5
cases (3 from DNA-CMD-3, and 2 from DNA-CMD-4). As such, the clearance rates
from DNA-CMD-3 and -4 do not provide any real information regarding the
effectiveness of DNA evidence in producing clearances in comparison to the much
larger number of cases found in DNA-CM-1 and -2. However, what is clear is that in
deference to hypothesis 2, homicide cases which have used a DNA analysis do not
have higher clearance rates than non-DNA cases.

Figure 5.
Clearance rates of DNA Case Models per year
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Implications for DNA Databases
Today, the building of large databases in which the DNA of past offenders can be
easily and inexpensively compared to DNA found at crime scenes is at the forefront of
many criminal justice policy initiatives (FirstGov, 2006). These initiatives are largely
reliant upon the assumption that matching someone’s DNA to a crime scene will be
the defining measure of the matched suspect’s guilt. The efficacy of building large
DNA databases as a means of clearing more homicide cases is directly tied to this
principle (Fisher, 2000; Geberth, 1996), and can be examined by looking at the
number of open cases in which evidence likely to yield DNA was collected but not
analyzed or used in relation to clearance, and those cases in which a DNA analysis
exists that are still open. From Figure 4 we can see that 60 out of the 230 cases which
asked for a DNA analysis and did not obtain it are open and therefore the possibility
exists that the use of a large DNA database could possibly assist in clearing those 60
cases in the future. This 60, plus the 29 cases in which DNA evidence is
available/used but no arrest has been made (DNA-CMD-3 and 4), gives a total of 89
cases, out of an original 593 (or 15%); in all other cases an arrest was made through
other means, DNA was already being used successfully, or DNA was determined not
to be a factor. However, out of the 40 DNA cases analyzed, 16 (or 40%) discovered
only the victim’s DNA (Table 1). Therefore, if we are to expect that 40% of the time
DNA taken from homicide crime scenes will only come back to the victim, the resulting
number of cases which would most likely be afforded a DNA match between a
suspect and evidence from a crime scene by the use of a large DNA database drops
to 54. In other words, if DNA from every human being in America was available for
comparison to the DNA found at homicide crime scenes, this data indicates the
maximum possible increase in overall homicide clearance to be approximately 9.1%
(54 out of 593).
However, given the clearance rates of DNA-CMD-3, and -4, it would seem highly
unlikely that all of the cases that have DNA evidence available for analysis would be
cleared if such a database did exist. In other words, it could very well be that a match
between a known individual and a DNA sample taken from a crime scene may be less
incriminating that previously believed. Given the nature of the crime of homicide—the
prerequisite emotion and proximity between victim and offender—the ability to place
certain suspects in proximity to the crime scene may have little or no investigative
value. Imagine the case of a homicide believed to have been committed by an
intimate partner of the victim. If that victim were killed in the home they both shared
(bedroom, bathroom, or kitchen), the presence of the other’s DNA at the scene may
be of little or no investigative value as the suspected individual may have deposited
that DNA at anytime in the past, not necessarily in conjunction with the homicide.
From Table 1 it is evident that in 6 of the 40 cases (or 15% of the time) the DNA
analyzed found a match between a tested subject and evidence collected from the
crime scene. However, out of these six cases, only three resulted in an arrest. From
this it can be clearly seen that a DNA match between a known individual and evidence
from a crime scene does not necessarily equate to clearing that homicide. There may
be many reasons for a DNA match not translating into an arrest in homicide cases.
The above example notwithstanding, another possibility found in one of the cases
analyzed, was that the DNA analysis did not single out any one person. In that case,
a woman had been killed and the investigation focused on those whom she had
recently been sexually involved with—an excellent investigative tack, given the other
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available information at the scene. However, when the resulting DNA analysis came
back indicating five separate male donors, all of which were already under suspicion,
the DNA analysis did not serve to assist an arrest, as the DNA analysis did not
provide the police any new information. In fact, there existed myriad convoluted
issues regarding the uses of the DNA analyses within the 40 cases examined. As
such, it would be erroneous to believe, even if DNA databases could provide all of the
cases in DNA-CMD-2 with matches between known individuals and evidence from
8
crime scenes, that they would end up being cleared because of it. Therefore, in
deference to hypothesis 3, it would seem likely that the creation of large DNA
databases will not assist in significantly raising the homicide clearance rate.
Hypothesis 4 will be addressed in the discussion section below.

Table 1.
How DNA evidence was used in each of the 40 DNA cases (CMD-3 and -4)
CMD-3
How DNA
Was Used
Victim Only
DNA
Direct Link
Database
Could
Provide
Further
Lead
Insufficient
DNA for
Analysis
Total
Note:

CMD-4

Total

Open

Cleared

Open

Cleared

8

7

1

0

16

2

2

1

1

6

6

0

9

1

16

2

0

0

0

2

18

9

11

2

40

Victim only DNA: All DNA analyzed came back to the victim;
Direct Link: DNA analysis provided a link between a known suspect and evidence from a crime
scene or victim.
Data Base Could Provide Further Lead: Representative of a database of the entire U.S. Population.
Insufficient DNA For Analysis: A determination made by the OCME in the attempt to analyze
submitted evidence.

Discussion
In using a DNA analysis, the most salient variable in deference to a homicide
investigation is the time involved in processing the evidence in question. The shortest
turn-around time for the scientific analysis of DNA evidence in any of the 40 DNA
cases examined was several weeks—the longest was several years. Clearly the
8

Accepting the limitations of the tiny numbers analyzed here (6 direct links with only 3 arrests), it could be
argued that only half of those cases which receive a match will end in arrest. Therefore, it could be that
the most realistic expectation for an increase in homicide clearance via the use of DNA, even if DNA from
every person in America were available, to be around 4.6%.
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establishment of an investigative tack (if not the resolution of most homicide cases
which are cleared) would have taken place within the first several weeks of an
investigation (for example, 69.44% of the cleared cases examined in the present
9
study were cleared within one month). Further, because of the delay and expense in
analyzing DNA evidence, detectives may only be turning to DNA evidence after all
other forms of evidence and investigative techniques have been exhausted.
Therefore, the very few cases which have been afforded a DNA analysis pre-arrest (N
= 40) may simply be the result of perceived necessity on behalf of those investigating
the homicide (i.e. investigators only turn to DNA after everything else has failed).
However, it should be noted that this necessity is based on the ability to produce an
arrest, not the scientific or objective accuracy of that arrest. This can be seen in the
present analysis: twice as many cases in 2003 had evidence likely to yield DNA
(DNA-CMD-2) taken from crime scenes than in 1996, and this Case Model
Designation has the highest overall clearance rate. From this it could be concluded
that within the Borough of Manhattan investigators are doing a better job today of
covering all the forensic bases at the scene, but by the time the evidence has been
analyzed, an arrest has already taken place. As such, it would behoove those who
have already secured an arrest through more traditional means (i.e. confessions or
eye-witness testimony), not to mention fiscally expedient, to stop the analytic process
for that case, allowing those resources (both manpower and scientific analysis) to be
used for other cases which have not been cleared.
Expedience vs. Accuracy
The true cost of a trade-off of accuracy for expediency, in both money and
miscarriages of justice is unknown. However, the literature on homicide investigation
makes clear the desire for homicide detectives to rely on the efficacy of forensic
evidence in general, and DNA in particular, in solving homicide cases.
Today, forensic DNA typing is having a significant impact on violent
criminal investigations and has revolutionized the ability to identify
criminals through national DNA offender data bases (Fisher, 2000, pg.
217).
The astute homicide investigator will use these new advances in
scientific law enforcement [DNA] to eliminate or include suspects
during the investigation and add to the body of evidence for a
subsequent trial (Geberth, 1996, pg. 539).
However, Pratt, Gaffney, Lovrich, and Johnson (2006) found that there are
currently approximately 96,000 open homicide cases in the U.S. awaiting the results
of a DNA analysis. These two opposing forces, the desire to clear homicides
accurately and the backlog created by the time and expense of DNA testing, create a
rather unique challenge for those investigating homicides today. This challenge is
best summed up by the question: How certain do we need to be before we can make
an arrest in a homicide case? This challenge is, of course, not only experienced in
homicide investigations. Many different types of crimes can utilize DNA evidence
9

Conversations with the Forensic Investigations Division and the Central Investigation & Resource
Division of the NYPD have indicated that in 1996 a single DNA analysis cost in excess of $1,000. By
2007 that cost has been projected to drop to approximately $300 or less.
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(Pratt et al., 2006, state that there are 446,723 other cases awaiting results of a DNA
analysis). However, given the nature of some of these other crimes, the evidence
created by the DNA analysis may be much more incriminating. Take for instance the
case of a burglary, or a stranger-to-stranger rape. The presence of the suspect’s
DNA in almost any capacity would be incriminating and suggest guilt. However, in
most homicide investigations the relational distance between victim and any potential
offender may negate the power this form of evidence has with other crimes, like
burglary or any stranger-to-stranger offense.
Clearly society wants detectives to use physical evidence in generating probable
cause as much as possible—it makes for more accurate arrests. Further, homicide
detectives are only given one avenue of evaluation by their superiors, their clearance
rate (Simon, 1991). In other words, homicide detectives are highly motivated to make
arrests. The number of “whodunit” cases in DNA-CMD-2 and its overall clearance
rate may be indicative of the fact that in a significant number of cases the evidentiary
certainty provided by physical evidence has succumbed to the expediency of using
other forms of evidence which meet the evidentiary value of probable cause to make
an arrest. As such it seems clear that a great deal could be learned about the true
success rate (or the “correct” rate) of homicide arrests and the use of DNA analysis, if
the evidence likely to yield DNA in all the cases in DNA-CMD-2 could also be
analyzed. Whatever the outcome of analyzing all possible DNA evidence found at
homicide crime scenes, Table 1 indicates that a significant number (11 out of 40, or
27.5%) of DNA analyses have excluded a tested subject and remained open.
However, that means that only 1.8% of the total number of cases (11 out of 593) could
have been corrected by a DNA analysis. Therefore, in deference to hypothesis 4, a
corrective effect fostered by DNA evidence alone is impossible for this sample.
However, how all forms of objective physical evidence working together over the last
40 years may have produced a corrective effect has yet to be examined, and
therefore is an excellent area of future research.
Summary
There is no doubt that the analysis of DNA evidence from crime scenes can be a
powerful tool in determining the identity of the subjects responsible for that crime.
However, the current analysis throws some doubt on exactly how useful DNA can be
in clearing homicide cases. The overall percentage of cases that have a DNA
analysis available to them pre-arrest is 6.7%. When we account for the number of
cases which have no investigative need for forensic evidence (the dunkers) this
percentage rises to 9.3%. Only 22.7% of those whodunit cases which collected
evidence “likely to yield a DNA analysis” (DNA-CMD-2) had a DNA analysis available
to them pre-arrest. Further, the creation of larger DNA databases will most likely only
modestly raise homicide clearance (at most 9.1%), given the number of cases which
can be assisted by a DNA analysis and the number of direct DNA links between crime
scenes and known suspects which did not end in arrest.
Many possibilities still exist regarding the use of DNA evidence at the investigative
stage of a homicide. As the time needed to process DNA evidence may be at a
minimum several weeks, detectives may be seeking its use in only those cases where
they have no other evidence to go on. Therefore, the present analysis could be
pointing out a refinement to the efficacy of using DNA evidence. The use of DNA
analyses may not help a great deal in increasing clearance rates, but it may stop the
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police from making a certain number of arrests in cases where DNA evidence is
analyzed and provides information favorable to the accused (i.e. the corrective effect).
Clearly within a significant percentage of DNA cases the DNA analysis failed to
implicate a tested subject and the case remains open (Table1; 11 out of 40 or 27.5%).
Therefore, it could be said that when a DNA analysis is available pre-arrest, over onequarter of the time the analysis serves in some capacity to prevent what could have
been a wrongful arrest had that DNA analysis not existed. However, given the tiny
overall number of DNA cases (6.7%), drawing such a conclusion based solely on DNA
evidence would be erroneous.
Either way, it seems clear that before we can understand the significance of DNA
evidence to homicide investigation, it must be used much more often. To accomplish
this, two things are made apparent by the present analysis. First, the analysis of DNA
evidence must be made available to the homicide investigator more quickly than it has
in the past. Second, as the cost of DNA analyses continues to drop, those cases in
which DNA evidence is available for analysis must be provided the benefit of that
analysis. Only then can we get some adequate understanding of how DNA evidence
has, and can, assist in increasing the efficacy of homicide investigations.
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